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THE CONSTITUTION OF FEAR
Frederick Schauer*
At various places along the Massachusetts Thrnpike, a limited access toll road with a speed limit (in most places) of 65
miles per hour, there are signs cautioning drivers not to back up
on the turnpike if they have missed their desired exit. These
signs tell us much about Massachusetts drivers, since in most
other states we could not imagine the need for such signs, precisely because we could scarcely imagine the possibility of drivers
engaging in the behavior that Massachusetts sees a need to warn
against.
As they tell us much about Massachusetts drivers, these
signs also instruct us in constitutional jurisprudence. Like the
signs on the Thrnpike, constitutional provisions tend to presuppose the likelihood of the behavior they prohibit. Just as there
are no signs on the Thrnpike prohibiting throwing Molotov cocktails at other vehicles, so too do we rarely see constitutional provisions addressed to theoretically unpleasant situations factually
unlikely to occur in the world. And just as the signs on the Thmpike prohibit what the sign posters believe is actually likely to
happen, so too do the drafters of constitutions go out of their
way to address what they see as genuine threats.
Yet what is a genuine threat at one time may not be a genuine threat at another. Few students of American history fail to
understand the perceived need, in 1791, for the Third Amendment, yet for the same reason it is unlikely that the Third
Amendment would find its way into a constitution newly rewritten in 1995. That the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention
of gender discrimination is historically unsurprising, just as it is
historically unsurprising that gender discrimination is explicitly
prohibited in virtually every one of the new constitutions now
emerging throughout the world.
From this perspective, the imperfections of the Constitution
of the United States, in 1995, are likely to be imperfections of
two types - guarding against problems that no longer exist, and
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not guarding against problems that exist now but did not exist (or
were not then perceived as existing) at earlier times. As examples of the former, we have not only the Third Amendment,
whose prohibition of a non-problem is relatively costless, but also
the more costly efforts to guard against dangers now far less apparent, such as the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in
civil cases and the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.l And as examples of the latter, we might quickly think of
the lack of (textual) protection for the right to privacy or the
right to be free from discrimination on account of, say, gender or
sexual orientation. And many people believe (although I am not
one of them) that the lack of term limits and the lack of a requirement of a balanced budget are perfect examples of the fact
that the eighteenth century constitution did not anticipate all of
the threats posed by the twenty-first century United States.
Yet the biggest question of guarding against what are now
non-problems and not guarding against what are now problems is
one not restricted to particular constitutional provisions. Rather,
the eighteenth century constitution adopts a certain perspective
about the state itself, not unlike the one that Massachusetts appears to adopt with respect to the people who are armed with
automobiles. The eighteenth century constitution is not only a
Lockean document, but in an important but less direct way a
Hobbesian one, having as dim a view of concentrations of state
power as Hobbes had about human nature in general. Whether
it be the rejection of a parliamentary system in favor of strong
checks and balances, the existence of numerous requirements of
supermajorities (as, for example, with the trial of impeachments,
amending the Constitution, and ratification of treaties), and the
various side constraints of the Bill of Rights, an underlying
theme of the Constitution has always been that the dangers of
mistaken governmental action are more to be feared than the
dangers of mistaken governmental inaction. To modify Black1. Implicit in the statement in the text is my belief that, judicial interpretations
notwithstanding, the existence of the Second Amendment has legitimated a certain rhetoric and politics that have made gun control more difficult than would otherwise have been
the case. I should note as well that a serious investigation into constitutional imperfection
would examine with some care the genuine costs of various constitutional provisions.
Although many parts of the constitution undoubtedly save lives, other parts most likely
cost them. How many lives have been lost by the Second Amendment? How many by
the Eighth's non-prohibition of capital punishment? How many by the 1\venty-Ftrst's
permission (against the background of the Eighteenth) of the manufacture, sale, and
transportation of intoxicating liquors? Although not all parts of the Constitution can or
should be evaluated by even a non-quantified cost-benefit analysis, some parts can be,
and a careful look at constitutional imperfection would try to examine whether the costs
of some constitutional provisions (or non-provisions) greatly outweigh their benefits.
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stone's maxim about the criminal law, it appears that the existing
Constitution is premised on the belief that it is better that ten
good things go undone than that one bad one be permitted.
Such a libertarian view of the state may still be appropriate.
Talk of "gridlock" may be misguided, and now just as in the
eighteenth century the dangers of government overreaching may
be far greater than the dangers of government impotence. But
perhaps not. If knowing what we know about the world and the
history of this country we were now to redraft the Constitution,
would we be so concerned with George III, or would we instead
be more concerned with the problems of government inaction?
No amount of attention, however appropriate, to individual
clauses and individual doctrines can transcend the fact that it is
widely believed in other countries that the degree of distrust of
government in the United States, a distrust both fostered by and
reflected in the Constitution, surpasses that of any other country
on the planet, including many whose populations have far greater
reason to distrust their government than we have to distrust ours.
If we are looking for constitutional imperfection, we would be
better off looking not for various clauses or doctrines that could
be different, but instead at whether the constitutional structure
we now have has imperfectly calibrated, in light of the problems
we now face, the balance between the dangers of erroneous governmental empowerment and the dangers of erroneous governmental disempowerment. The overarching theme of the
Constitution of the United States, and the "who's to say/where
do you draw the line/thin edge of the wedge/parade of horribles/
foot in the door/slippery slope" rhetoric it has engendered, is one
of fear, a fear that in 1787 and 1791 was properly aimed at the
state. Yet just as the signs on the Massachusetts Thrnpike would
be misguided were Massachusetts drivers to become more sensible, so too would the aim of the eighteenth century Constitution governmental tyranny - be misguided if the target had shifted.
Whether it has is a question both political and empirical. But the
measure of the imperfection of the Constitution is the extent to
which the entire Constitution, as written, interpreted, and understood, is aimed at a danger that occupies a different position on
the spectrum of all dangers than it did two centuries ago. If that
is the case, then the imperfection of American constitutionalism
cannot be trivialized by identifying the occasional flaws in this
clause or that. To pick out a clause or two as imperfect is implicitly to endorse the remainder. Whether the remainder, in the
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large and not in the small, is worthy of endorsement is an issue,
in an era of constitutional transformation throughout the world,
that should not easily be ignored.

